Collective Learning for Civil Society Resilience

Coalition work has become a popular, and perhaps the most effective, approach to strengthen an enabling environment for civil society. In highly restrictive regimes that we looked at, such as the cases in Nicaragua or Ethiopia, they offered protection, cover and dispersed risk amongst participants. They also provide economies of scale through sharing resources: such as technical expertise and joint strategies or offer assistance through coordinated responses and providing a unified voice across multiple groups. In some settings, where closing space is more subtle or technical in its manifestation, umbrella bodies or networks can play a vital unifying role by collating the experiences and positions of different groups affected by the phenomenon. It’s important to note that coalitions don’t have to involve formal, registered institutions, and in some cases, it is preferable that they are less formal. This can help to bridge the work between formal organisations and social movements.

Shared trust and shared vision were often cited as an important factor in successful efforts to respond to closing civic space. This requires an investment of time from the outset as a way of determining the shared values in a human rights context. In some cases, it was also about building trust with the government. Those who adopted adaptive strategies for example, were aiming to build trust with the government with the goal of keeping some degree of civic space active. This position is difficult to maintain. On one hand, organisations need to ensure that they are working in solidarity with partners, and on the other, an enabling environment for civil society requires a degree of trust and engagement with government actors, who many deem to be threatening. Taking the time to build trust and knowing where the ‘red lines are’ is important and should be negotiated with local actors rather than assumed.

Many ICSOs and coalitions have addressed the closure of civic space. However, responses require a balance of long-term, proactive thinking with the agility to respond to political opportunities. In Poland, the “It Works” campaign did just that. The coalition’s long-term aim was to change the impression of civil society in the eyes of the public after years of a narrative of mistrust was built up by politicians and the media. It was agile enough an to link a teacher’s strike to education’s relationship to civil society, making clear to the public the connectivity and impact of civil society institutions to the long-term health of society.

Civic space programming can be a catalyst for wider organisational change. Whilst a strategy for solidarity may be adopted in one or two national contexts, they may provide feedback mechanisms to engender wider organisational shifts. For example, Plan International situated their support for young women’s groups in Latin America within a wider organisational strategy to localise and to shift power to the region. We found that when international organisations had flexible pots of innovation funding, internal champions used the funds to show solidarity against closing civic space which then shifted organisational practice more broadly.

The lack of capacity, human resources and financial support/ flexibility came up consistently in all of our case studies, especially in the coalitions. In many instances, civic space was seen by some as a diversion away from core programming work. This meant that, in the case of coalitions, some organisations didn’t always see the need to prioritise engagement if there was competing priorities of partners. This is a serious concern because collective decision-making, especially in the early days of a coalition, takes time and focus. It also meant that resources required for successful work in this area were scarce and hard to sustain, especially over longer periods of time. Underestimating capacity needs could dilute attempts at building and sustaining solidarity.

Who shares the risk when it comes to civic space? There can be a clash between donor expectations and those on the ground, where the former demands high levels of reporting and accountability procedures. But when groups on the ground are being attacked, a degree of flexibility is required. Solidarity requires an agreement as to who shares the risk and how that will be managed, and it prompts a discussion about which mode of solidarity (the ‘how’) will be adopted. For example Helvetas, who sought to secure safe access by partner organisations to UN processes in a very closed context, had to ensure that the safety of activists engaging in the UN processes could be managed, as in this instance it involved a high degree of risk to activists.

While closing civic space can be seen as an existential threat, its response can require a very technical know-how on sometimes minute areas of policy. Our cases looked at how civil society groups addressed this, bringing in technical expertise in international anti-terrorism policy, complex accounting procedures, or the mechanisms behind internet shutdowns. But not all CSOs have this capacity, and therefore the added value of civil society infrastructure and umbrella organisations is vital. Resourcing this is a challenge that demands a coordinated response.

A number of organisations in our case studies underwent substantial reviews and strategy development in reaction to direct attacks, which all need to be sufficiently resourced, both in terms of staff time and financially. It’s also important to note that this requires the right people to be involved, from financial and legal staff to policy and programme people.

Many organisations will also have small ‘innovation funds’ available. Internal champions can seek access to these types of funds to achieve a number of aims surrounding civic space solidarity. For example, gathering the right allies for any working group or initiative on the subject; investing in intra-organisational sharing of lessons from different contexts; or creating new tools to help partners adapt or assess risk.

Civic space can be a huge catalyst for change in organisational practice. The issue can link, stronger practices around ‘localisation’, or help build stronger alignment between different parts of an organisation as well as between humanitarian/development and human rights approaches. It can also help frame discussions around issues about the role of the CSO more broadly.

Solidarity doesn’t just mean public campaigning or statements. There is a spectrum of mechanisms and modes available to organisations from careful or risk-averse to bold and outward facing. Selecting the right or most effective combination of modes and tactics requires trusting partnerships that have been built over the long-term, understanding the political context, a shared risk analysis between partners, allies and internally bodies and then the joint development of a multi-pronged approach, as outlined here. The dilemma between maintaining ICSO access to a country versus addressing civic space concerns head on is not a black and white decision that can be made by an ICSO programme or Board, and there are multiple tools available to balance different interests.

Given the cross-cutting nature of civil society space, and the threats facing groups and activists across the thematic spectrum, coalitions will often be broad and diverse. Whilst this is critical to achieve impact, it is equally important to articulate the shared values as a solid base on which to build collective action. A rights-based approach was often taken in establishing shared values and helping to negotiate the messages, risk appetites and priorities of the coalition, as well as membership.

Coalitions will often need a secretariat, but long-term sustainability requires a shared ownership amongst the broadest member group possible to drive collective action and secure active engagement. Newly established coalitions should invest in facilitation time to agree the terms of common ownership, including roles and responsibilities. These should be articulated in writing, such as through a memorandum of understanding (MoU).

Even with long-term flexible funding, donors generally look for clear ‘outcomes’ to be defined and reported on in grant-making. In the case of civic space, sometimes just keeping civil society present, functioning and secure is a legitimate goal of programming in this area. Real outcomes will be seen long-term and through sustained investment over time.

Work on civic space can require a significant amount of risk and donors should be sharing this with ICSOs and their partners. Being clear on who is bearing the risk and how that will be managed should be articulated.

Donors often have a strong oversight of different initiatives between civil society groups, and across national boundaries. This ‘helicopter view’ should help to seek out and amplify connecting opportunities between different, but aligned initiatives working on civic space matters. Donors can connect these and help create spaces for adequate learning and information sharing.